About three decades ago it was realized that implementing private channels between parties which can be adaptively corrupted requires an encryption scheme that is secure against selective opening attacks. Whether standard (IND-CPA) security implies security against selective opening attacks has been a major open question since. The only known reduction from selective opening to IND-CPA security loses an exponential factor. A polynomial reduction is only known for the very special case where the distribution considered in the selective opening security experiment is a product distribution, i.e., the messages are sampled independently from each other.
Introduction
Security under Selective Opening Attacks. Consider a scenario where many parties 1, . . . , n send messages to one common receiver. To transmit a message m i , party i samples fresh randomness r i and sends the ciphertext c i = Enc pk (m i ; r i ) to the receiver. Consider an adversary A that does not only eavesdrop on the sent ciphertexts (c 1 , . . . , c n ), but corrupts a set I ⊆ [n] of the sender's systems, thus learning the encrypted message m i and the randomness r i used to encrypt m i . The natural question to ask is whether the messages of uncorrupted parties remain confidential. Such attacks are referred to as selective opening (SO) attacks (under sender corruption).
Selective opening attacks naturally occur in multi-party computation where we assume secure channels between parties. Since a party might become corrupted, we would need the encryption on the channels to be selective opening secure. In practice the same argument applies to a server that establishes secure connections that shall remain secure if users are corrupted.
Difficulty of Proving Security under Selective Opening Attacks. The widely accepted standard notion for public-key encryption schemes is indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA security). At first sight one might consider a straight-forward hybrid argument to show that IND-CPA security already implies security against selective opening attacks since every party samples fresh randomness independently. However, so far nobody has been able to bring forward such a hybrid argument in general. Notice that revealing randomness r i allows a selective opening adversary to verify that a corrupted ciphertext c i is an encryption of m i . The adversary's possibility to corrupt parties introduces a difficulty in proving that standard (IND-CPA) security already implies selective opening security. It seems that the reduction has to know (i.e. guess) the complete set I of all corruptions going to be made by A in order to serve its security game before A actually announces the senders it wishes to corrupt. Since I might be any subset of {1, . . . , n}, a direct approach would lead to an exponential loss in the reduction. A main technical obstacle is that the encrypted messages may depend on each other. If, for example, they are encrypted and sent sequentially, message m i may depend on m i−1 and all previous messages. Thus, corrupting some parties might already leak some information on messages sent by parties that have not been corrupted.
Until today, the only result in the standard model, given in [8, 3] , shows that IND-CPA implies selective opening security for the special case of a product distribution, i.e., when all messages m 1 , . . . , m n are sampled independently from each other. Intuitively, this holds since corrupting some ciphertext cannot reveal information on related messages if there are no related messages at all and the hybrid argument one might expect to work goes through. This leaves the following open question:
Does standard security imply selective opening security for any non-trivial message distribution?
Our Contributions
We present the first non-trivial positive results in the standard model, namely we show that IND-CPA security implies IND-SO-CPA security for a class of message distributions with few dependencies. Here IND-SO-CPA security refers to the indistinguishability-based definition of selective opening security sometimes referred to as weak IND-SO-CPA security [4] .
IND-SO-CPA requires that a passive adversary that obtains ciphertexts (c 1 , . . . , c n ) and has access to a ciphertext opening oracle, revealing the underlying message m i of some ciphertext c i and the randomness used to encrypt m i , cannot distinguish the originally encrypted messages from freshly resampled messages that are as likely as the original messages given the messages of opened ciphertexts.
We consider graph-induced distributions where dependencies among messages correspond to edges in a graph and show that IND-CPA implies IND-SO-CPA security for all graph-induced distributions that satisfy a certain low connectivity property.
In particular, our result holds for the class of Markov distributions, i.e. distributions on message vectors (m 1 , . . . , m n ) where all information relevant for the distribution of m i is present in m i−1 . We prove that any IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme is IND-SO-CPA secure if the messages are sampled from a Markov distribution. Our results cover for instance distributions where message m i contains all previous messages (e.g. email conversations) or distributions where messages are increasing, i.e., m 1 ≤ m 2 ≤ . . . ≤ m n .
Note that a positive result on "weak" IND-SO-CPA security for all IND-CPA-secure encryption schemes for certain distributions is the best we can hope for due to the negative result of Bellare et al. [1] ruling out such an implication for SIM-SO-CPA security.
Details. Think of a vector of n messages sampled from some distribution D as a graph G on n vertices {1, . . . , n} where we have an edge from message m i to message m j if the distribution of m j depends on m i . Further, fix any subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of opening queries made by some adversary. The main observation is that removing I and all incident edges, G decomposes into connected components C 1 , . . . , C n that can be resampled independently, since the distribution of messages on C k solely depends on the messages in the neighborhood of C k and D.
To argue that there is no efficient adversary A SO that distinguishes sampled and resampled messages in the selective opening experiment, we proceed in a sequence of hybrid games, starting in a game where after receiving encryptions of sampling messages and replies to opening queries, A SO obtains the sampled messages. In each hybrid step we use IND-CPA security to replace sampled messages on a connected component C k with resampled messages without A SO noticing. To this end, the reduction from IND-CPA to the indistinguishability of two consecutive hybrids has to identify C k to embed its own challenge before A SO makes any opening query.
We consider two approaches for guessing C k . The first will consider graphs that have only polynomially many connected subgraphs; hence, the reduction can guess C k right away. The second approach studies graphs for which every connected subgraph has a neighborhood of constant size; this allows the reduction to guess C k by guessing its neighborhood. We show that the first approach ensures a reduction with polynomial loss for a strictly greater class of graphs than the second one.
Additionally, when the distribution is induced by an acyclic graph, we give a more sophisticated hybrid argument for the second approach, where in each hybrid transition only a single sampled message is replaced by a resampled message, allowing for a tighter reduction. Due to the definition of the hybrids, it will suffice to guess on fewer vertices of C k 's neighborhood.
Previous Work
There are three not polynomially equivalent definitions of SO-secure encryption [4] . Since messages in the IND-SO experiment have to be resampled conditioned on opened messages, there are two notions based on indistinguishability: Weak IND-SO restricts to distributions that support efficient conditional resampling. Bellare et al. [2] gave an indistinguishability-based notion for passive adversaries, usually referred to as IND-SO-CPA. Full IND-SO allows for arbitrary distributions on the messages and is due to Böhl et al. [4] , who adopted a notion for commitment schemes from [2] to encryption.
SIM-SO captures semantic security and demands that everything an adversary can output can be computed by a simulator that only sees the messages of corrupted parties, whereas it does not see the public key, any ciphertext or any randomness. The notion dates back to Dwork et al. [8] , who studied the selective decommitment problem, and does not suffer from a distribution restriction like weak IND-SO, since it does not involve resampling.
The first IND-SO-CPA-secure encryption scheme in the standard model was given in [2] based on lossy encryption. Selective opening secure encryption can be constructed from deniable encryption [6] as well as non-committing encryption [7] . Bellare et al. [3, 1] separated SIM-SO-CPA from IND-CPA security and showed that IND-CPA security implies weak IND-SO-CPA security if the messages are (basically) sampled independently. The same result was already established for commitment schemes in [8] .
To date, this is the only positive result that shows that IND-CPA implies weak IND-SO-CPA in the standard model. Full IND-SO-CPA and SIM-SO-CPA security were separated in [4] ; neither of them implies the other. Hofheinz et al. [10] proved that IND-CPA implies weak IND-SO-CPA in the generic group model for a certain class of encryption schemes and separated IND-CCA from weak IND-SO-CCA security.
Recently, Hofheinz et al. [9] constructed the first (even IND-CCA-secure) PKE that is not weakly IND-SO-CPA secure. Their result relies on the existence of public-coin differing-inputs obfuscation and certain correlation intractable hash functions. Their scheme employs "secret-sharing message distributions" whose messages are evaluations of some polynomial. It is easily seen that such distributions have too many dependencies to be covered by our positive result. There is a gap between their result and ours, that is, distributions for which it is still open whether IND-CPA implies IND-SO-CPA.
Preliminaries
We denote by λ the security parameter. A function f is polynomial in n, f (n) = poly(n), if
Any algorithm receives the unary representation 1 λ of the security parameter as first input. We say that an algorithm is a PPT algorithm if it runs in probabilistic polynomial time (in λ). For a finite set S we denote the sampling of a uniform random element a by a ←$ S, and the sampling according to some distribution D by a ← D. 
Games
A game G is a collection of procedures or oracles {Initialize, P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P t , Finalize} for t ≥ 0. Procedures P 1 to P t and Finalize might require some input parameters. We implicitly assume that boolean flags are initialized to false, numerical types are initialized to 0, sets are initialized to ∅, while strings are initialized to the empty string . An adversary A is run in game G if A calls Initialize. During the game A may run some procedure P i as often as allowed by the game.
For each game in this paper, the "Open" procedure may be called an arbitrary number of times, while every other procedure is called once during the execution.
The interface of the game is provided by the challenger. If A calls P, its output is returned to A, except for the Finalize procedure. On A's call of Finalize the game ends and outputs whatever Finalize returns. Let G A ⇒ out denote the event that G runs A and outputs out. The advantage Adv(G A , H A ) of A in distinguishing games G and H is defined as Pr[
We let Bad denote the event that a boolean flag Bad was set to true during the execution of some game.
Public-Key Encryption Schemes
A public-key encryption scheme consists of three PPT algorithms. Gen generates a key pair (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 λ ) on input 1 λ . The public key pk implicitly contains 1 λ and defines three finite sets: the message space M, the randomness space R, and the ciphertext space C. Given pk, a message m ∈ M and randomness r ∈ R, Enc outputs an encryption c = Enc pk (m; r) ∈ C of m under pk. The decryption algorithm Dec takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C as input and outputs a message m = Dec sk (c) ∈ M, or a special symbol ⊥ ∈ M indicating that c is not a valid ciphertext. In the following we let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) denote a public-key encryption scheme.
We require PKE to be correct: for all security parameters λ, for all (pk , sk ) ← Gen(1 λ ), and for all m ∈ M we have Pr[Dec sk (Enc pk (m; r)) = m] = 1 where the probability is taken over the choice of r. We apply Enc and Dec to message vectors m = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) and randomness r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) as Enc(m; r) := (Enc(m 1 ; r 1 ), . . . , Enc(m n ; r n )).
IND-CPA and mult-IND-CPA Security
We revise the standard notion of IND-CPA security and give a definition of indistinguishable ciphertext vectors under chosen-plaintext attacks that will allow for cleaner proofs of our results. 
IND-SO-CPA Security
In this section we recall an indistinguishability-based definition for selective opening security under chosen-plaintext attacks and discuss the existing notions of SO security.
is efficiently resamplable if the following properties hold for every λ ∈ N:
Resamplability. There exists a PPT resampling algorithm
A class of families of distributions D is efficiently resamplable if every family {D λ } λ∈N ∈ D is efficiently resamplable.
Since the security parameter uniquely specifies an element of a family D λ we write D instead of D λ whenever the security parameter is already fixed. 
Notions of Selective Opening Security. Definition 2.4 is in the spirit of [2] but we allow for adaptive corruptions and let the adversary choose the distribution, as done by Böhl et al. [4] . The latter renamed IND-SO-CPA to weak IND-SO-CPA and introduced a strictly stronger notion, called full IND-SO-CPA, where A SO may submit any distribution (even one not efficiently resamplable) and need not provide a resampling algorithm. 1 We consider the name weak IND-SO-CPA unfortunate and simply refer to the security notion in Definition 2.4 as IND-SO-CPA security.
Selective Opening for Graph-Induced Distributions
This section considers graph-induced distributions and identifies connectivity properties so that IND-CPA entails IND-SO-CPA security. We introduce some notation in Sect. 3.1. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 discuss a hybrid argument that considers the connected components of G I , switching one of them from sampled to resampled in each transition. Sect. 3.4 discusses a different hybrid argument that will allow for tighter proofs if the distribution-inducing graph is acyclic.
Graphs
A directed graph G consists of a set of vertices V , identified with [n] for n > 0 and a set of
is obtained by adding the minimum number of edges to E so that the graph becomes undirected.
For a vertex v, we denote by P (v) = {j : (j, v) ∈ E} the set of its parents.
A path from v 1 to v in G is a list of at least two vertices (v 1 , . . . , v ) where
If there is a path from u to v then u is a predecessor of v. Let pred(v) denote the set of all predecessors of v. A cycle is a path where
We assume G to be connected if not stated otherwise. A (set-)maximal connected set of vertices of G is called connected component.
Notational convention. We do not distinguish between the i-th message of an n-message vector and vertex i in a graph on n vertices.
We start with defining Markov distributions, which are distributions on vectors of random variables reflecting processes, that is, variables with higher indices depend on ones with lower indices. A distribution is Markov if it is memoryless in the sense that all relevant information for the distribution of a value M i is already present in M i−1 , although the latter itself depends on its predecessor. Definition 3.1 Let {D λ } λ∈N be a family of distributions over M n . Let M = (M 1 , . . . , M n ) denote a vector of M-valued random variables. We say {D λ } λ∈N is Markov if the following holds for all λ ∈ N and all m ∈ M n :
Markov distribution can be seen as "induced" by a chain graph M 1 → M 2 → . . . → M n , where edges represent dependencies. We will now generalize this to arbitrary graphs and still require (a generalization of) "memorylessness". We say that a graph G induces a distribution D if whenever the distribution of M j depends on M i then there is a path from i to j in G. As for Markov distributions, we require that the distribution of a message only depends on its parents; in particular, for all λ ∈ N, all j ∈ [n] and M = (M 1 , . . . , M n ) ← D λ the distribution of M j only depends on its parents in G λ , i.e. the set P (j), rather than all its predecessors pred(j). Definition 3.2 (Graph-induced distribution) Let {D λ } λ∈N be a family of distributions over M n and let {G λ } λ∈N be a family of graphs on n vertices. We say that {D λ } λ∈N is {G λ } λ∈N -induced if the following holds for all λ ∈ N:
• For all i = j ∈ [n] if for D λ the distribution of M j depends on M i then there is a path from i to j in G λ .
• For all j ∈ [n] and all m ∈ M n we have
We demand that for any λ ∈ N one can efficiently reconstruct G λ from D λ .
As with a family of distributions, we drop the security parameter and say that D is G-induced whenever λ is already fixed. Note that G may contain cycles and may be undirected. Further note that Markov distributions can be seen as graph-induced distributions where the graph G = (V, E) is a chain on n vertices, that is,
Although our proof ideas can be applied to disconnected graphs directly, Sections 3.2 -3.4 consider connected graphs for simplicity. A hybrid argument over the connected components of a graph as given in Sect. 3.5 extends all our results to disconnected graphs. For example, for a chain graph on n vertices we have S(G) = 1 2 · n · (n + 1) and for the complete graph C n on n vertices we have S(C n ) = 2 n − 1. Theorem 3.4 Let PKE be IND-CPA secure. Then PKE is IND-SO-CPA secure w.r.t. the class of efficiently resamplable and G-induced distribution families over M n where S(G) = poly(n) and G is connected.
A Bound Using Connected Subgraphs
Precisely, for any adversary A SO run in game IND-SO-CPA PKE there exists an IND-CPA PKE adversary B CPA with roughly the running time of A SO plus two executions of Resamp such that ). We will define hybrid games H 0 , H 1 , . . . , H n . For this, let S ⊆ 2 V denote all the connected subgraphs of G. We have |S| = S(G).
Note that G I consists of connected components C 1 , . . . , C n ⊆ S for some n ≤ n − 1. (This upper bound is attained by the star graph when I consists of the internal node.) We assume those components to be ordered, e.g. by the smallest vertex contained in each. 
Proof of Theorem 3.4: For k = 0, . . . , n we define hybrid game H k as a modification of game IND-SO-CPA PKE , in which the messages of the first k batches C 1 , . . . , C k are resampled during Challenge while the remaining batches stay sampled. Every procedure except Challenge remains as in Definition 2.4, and Challenge is given in Figure 3 . Clearly, H 0 is the (real) game IND-SO-CPA PKE,0 and H n for some n ≤ n − 1 is the (random) game IND-SO-CPA PKE,1 . Note that for k, j ∈ [n , n] hybrids H k and H j are identical. We have
We now upper-bound the distance between two consecutive hybrids using the following lemma. Proof: We construct adversary B mult as follows (cf. Figure 4) : ) to its mult-IND-CPA challenger, obtains ciphertexts for positions in C * k+1 , picks randomness and uses it to encrypt each message in C * k+1 . B mult sends (c 1 , . . . , c n ) to A SO , embedding its challenge at positions C * k+1 and answers opening queries honestly if they do not occur on C * k+1 . If A SO issues such a query, B mult cannot answer and sets Bad := true since it guessed C k+1 wrong. During Challenge, B mult verifies that it guessed C k+1 correctly and sets Bad := true if not. B mult resamples messages m 1 that are sent in the first k batches while messages from m 0 are sent in every other position. B mult outputs A SO 's output.
In the following we use m ≡ m if m and m , interpreted as random variables, are identically distributed where the probability is taken over all choices in the computation of m, m , respectively.
Assume, B mult guessed correctly, i.e. C * k+1 = C k+1 . Clearly, B mult perfectly simulates hybrids H k and H k+1 for messages and ciphertexts at positions in C k+1 . Run in mult-IND-CPA PKE,0 , . Thus, the sampled and resampled messages change roles on C k+1 . However, they are equally distributed, i.e., m 0
since the messages in N (C k+1 ) were fixed when resampling m 1 and the distribution of messages in C k+1 depends on D and messages in positions N (C k+1 ) only. Likewise, m 1
) since the distribution of messages in C k+1 solely depends on D and messages in N (C k+1 ) ⊆ I and A SO 's view is identical to hybrid H k+1 . We have
Observe that Bad does not happen when B mult guessed C k+1 correctly. Since Bad is independent of A SO 's output in a hybrid and |S| = S(G), we have
which concludes the proof.
We proceed with the proof of Theorem 3.4. Using Lemma 3.5 we have
B mult sends message vectors of length |C * k+1 | ≤ n to its mult-IND-CPA challenger. Using Lemma 2.2:
since n ≤ n − 1, which completes the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Markov Distributions. Markov distributions (Definition 3.1) are induced by the chain graph 
A Bound Using the Maximum Border
Definition 3.7 (Maximum border) Let G = (V, E). We define the maximum border of G as the maximal size of the neighborhood of any connected subgraph in G.
For example, if G is an n-path for n ≥ 3 then B(G) = 2. For the complete graph or star graph on n vertices we have B(G) = n − 1. Notice that B(G) < n.
In the reduction in Sect. 3.2 we guessed a connected component in G I that would be switched from sampled to resampled in a hybrid transition. Alternatively, we can guess a connected component in G I via its neighborhood. The following theorem expresses S(G) in terms of B(G).
Theorem 3.8 Let G be a connected graph. Then the following bound on S(G) holds:
We begin with a simple observation before proving the theorem.
Lemma 3.9 Let G = (V, E) and
Proof of Theorem 3.8: Let B := B(G). We have
For i = 0 we count the connected components of G.
Applying Lemma 3.9 to V 1 , . . . , V k , we see that those sets V j are pairwise disjoint. Fix any vertex
and all V j are pairwise disjoint, there exists at least one
Hence, k ≤ B for given B and we obtain an upper bound for the number of possible sets V for each fixed V i . It follows
To bound the sum in (1) we use the geometric series and upper-bound the quotient of two consecutive binomial coefficients by 1 2 :
3 , which concludes the proof. Theorems 3.4 and 3.8 together now yield the following corollary. Corollary 3.10 Let PKE be IND-CPA secure. Then PKE is IND-SO-CPA secure w.r.t. the class of efficiently resamplable and G-induced distribution families over M n where B(G) = const, n ≥ 3 · B(G) + 2 and G is connected.
Concretely, for any adversary A SO in game IND-SO-CPA PKE there exists an IND-CPA PKE adversary B CPA with roughly the running time of A SO plus two executions of Resamp such that
Since Corollary 3.10 ensures a polynomial loss in the reduction for B(G) = const and we are interested in asymptotic statements, we do not consider the restriction to n ≥ 3 · B(G) + 2 grave. One can easily obtain a version of Theorem 3.8 that is weaker by a factor of roughly B(G) but holds for all B(G) < n. To this end one bounds the sum of binomial coefficients in (1) in terms of the incomplete upper gamma function Γ to get
Using a nice bound on Γ due to [11] that can be found in [5] we obtain a bound for B(G) < n.
Think of a direct reduction for proving Corollary 3.10 as implicitly guessing C k+1 via guessing N (C k+1 ) by picking up to B(G) vertices in G and guessing one of at most B(G) connected subgraphs that have the guessed neighborhood. Note that Corollary 3.10 cannot provide a tighter bound on the loss than Theorem 3.4. In particular, there are (even connected) graphs for which Theorem 3.4 ensures an at most polynomial loss, while Corollary 3.10 does not. For instance, let G be the star graph on log n vertices attached to the chain graph of n − log n vertices, then S(G) = poly(n), but B(G) > const.
A Tighter Reduction for Acyclic Graphs
While we considered graph-induced distributions for arbitrary graphs in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we now consider DAG-induced distributions for which we obtain a tighter reduction than what is guaranteed by Corollary 3.10.
For a DAG G we require that the vertices are semi-ordered in such a way that there is no directed path from i to j for i < j. Such an ordering always exists as G has no cycles. Note that the dependencies now go the other way as for Markov distributions, but this will allow us to replaced sampled messages by resampled ones from left to right as in the previous hybrids. We will traverse dependencies backwards, that is, if message m i depends on m j then m i is switched from sampled to resampled before m j is switched. So, as in the previous proofs, messages m 1 , . . . , m i will be resampled in the i-th hybrid.
Theorem 3.11 Let PKE be IND-CPA secure. Then PKE is IND-SO-CPA secure w.r.t. the class of efficiently resamplable and G-induced distribution families over M n where B(G) = const and G is a connected DAG.
Precisely, for any adversary A SO run in game IND-SO-CPA PKE there exists an IND-CPA PKE adversary B CPA with roughly the running time of A SO plus three executions of Resamp such that 
Proof:
We proceed in a sequence of hybrid games H 0 , H 1 , . . . , H n and switch message m k+1 from sampled to resampled in hybrid transition H k to H k+1 . Hybrid H k will return the sampled messages for all positions [k + 1, n] ∪ I, but resampled messages on all positions [k] \ I where the resampling is conditioned on every message in [k + 1, n] ∪ I. The code for Challenge in given in Figure 5 , every other procedure stays as in Figure 2 . Hybrid H 0 is identical to game IND-SO-CPA PKE,0 , and H n is identical to IND-SO-CPA PKE,1 , hence
We bound the distance between two consecutive hybrids H k , H k+1 and proceed with the following lemma.
Lemma 3.12 For every adversary A SO that distinguishes hybrids H k and H k+1 there exists a mult-IND-CPA adversary B mult with roughly the running time of A SO plus three executions of Resamp such that Adv H
where
Proof Idea: We construct a mult-IND-CPA adversary B mult that interpolates between hybrids H k and H k+1 . Ideally, B mult embeds its own challenge at position k + 1, but might have to resample some already resampled messages in m Observe that it is sufficient to resample middle again to obtain consistent resampled messages. In particular, there is no need to resample any right message due to the semi-order imposed on the vertices, as a message in right does not depend on any message in right (cf. Figure 6) . The reduction will guess middle to embed its mult-IND-CPA challenge, while it waits for all opening queries to happen to resample the left messages. Note that middle and left are disconnected in G I , thus can be resampled independently of each other only depending on their respective neighborhood. Since right messages are fixed while resampling, it suffices to guess N (middle) 
Procedure Initialize
We describe B mult (cf. 
by Equation (3). B mult picks N * from a set of size for k = n − 1, respectively, which proves Lemma 3.12.
The remaining proof consists of tedious computations. From Equation (2) and Lemma 3.12 we have
Let B := B(G). Since B mult submits message vectors of length |middle * | ≤ k +1 to its mult-IND-CPA challenger and by Lemma 2.2:
We upper-bound the loss in (4). Let 2 ≤ B < n.
n − 1 i
n − 1 i Since G is connected we have B = 0 ⇔ n = 1, B = 1 ⇔ n = 2. Thus, it is easily verified that the bound holds for (B, n) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 2)} as well.
Because Markov distributions are DAG-induced by chain graphs and the maximum border of a chain graph is at most 2 we immediately obtain a tighter version of Corollary 3.6 whose proof directly follows from Theorem 3.11. Applying the proof of Theorem 3.11 directly to the Markov case gives a slightly better bound on the loss, namely n · (n + 1) · (2n + 1)/6, since N (middle) ∩ [n − 1] = 1 even for the last transition H n−1 to H n . Hence, the loss in Equation (4) Recall that the hybrids in the proof of Theorem 3.11 saved us a factor of n because it suffices to guess a set of size at most B(G) − 1 instead of B(G) for k < n − 1 as at least one vertex of the neighborhood of middle is contained in right.
The same hybrids can be used to strengthen Theorem 3.4 as it suffices to guess a connected subgraph in [k + 1] (instead of [n]) containing vertex k + 1.
Since G is connected, there is at least a path in {k + 1} ∪ right that contains k + 1, i.e. at least n − k connected subgraphs in right ∪ {k + 1}. Thus, there exist at least n − k connected subgraphs in G that contain vertex k + 1 and are identical if restricted to [k + 1]. Hence the probability that the reduction guesses C k+1 correctly can be increased from 1/S(G) to (n − k)/S(G), bringing the loss from O(n 2 ) · S(G) down to O(n · log n) · S(G).
A Hybrid Argument for Disconnected Graphs
Let G be a graph with z connected components. Fix any semi-order on them, e.g. ordered by the smallest vertex in each component and let V 1 , . . . , V z denote the sets of vertices of the connected components of G. For j ∈ [z + 1, n] let V j := ∅. We define a security game where an adversary plays the IND-SO-CPA game on a connected component of the graph that induced the distribution chosen by the adversary. In particular, we achieve versions of Theorem 3.4, Corollary 3.10 and Theorem 3.11 for disconnected graphs, where
S(C i ) and B(G) = max i∈ [z ] {B(C i )} for a graph G consisting of connected components C 1 , . . . , C z .
Moreover, for G = ([n], ∅) , G-induced distributions become product distributions, i.e. the messages are sampled independently. Hence, the positive result of [3] can be seen as a special case of Theorem 3.15.
